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Introduction 
The contemporary international economy is characterized by globalisation, economic integration, and 
increasing economic interdependence between states. The global financial crisis of 2008 caused major 
financial turmoil in the whole world, and it is a primary example of the strong interdependence between 
national economies. What started as a crisis in the subprime mortgage market in the United States, soon 
developed into an international banking crisis, followed by a global economic downturn and the European 
debt crisis. Consequently, none of the European states were spared in the economic crisis of 2008.  
 Small states are particularly vulnerable to changes in the international economy. Generally, they are 
dependent on international trade because of the limited size of their domestic markets. Because of their 
open economies, one would expect that small states were hit hard by the crisis. Iceland and Cyprus are the 
most evident examples of small state vulnerability during the crisis. The Cypriot economy was hit hard 
through the Greek debt crisis and eventually, Cyprus was among the five countries in the Eurozone that 
had to apply for a 10-billion-bailout agreement (Charalambous, 2014, p.14). Iceland was even more 
vulnerable, as it lacked external shelter from the European Union (Thorhallsson, 2011).  
However, in his classic volume Small States in World Markets (1985), Peter Katzenstein suggests that 
small states can pursue domestic strategies to overcome their vulnerability in the international economy. 
According to Katzenstein, some small European states have developed domestic democratic corporatist 
structures that provide them with the ability of flexible economic adjustment. Democratic corporatism 
functions as a mechanism to successfully cope with sudden international economic changes and adversity. 
Though Katzenstein’s theory has had major influence in the field of comparative politics and international 
relations, it has not remained unchallenged. The explanatory power of corporatism for macro-economic 
performance has been questioned in general, and one of the main critiques on Katzenstein has been that he 
avoids the issue of causal inference of the relationship between democratic corporatism and economic 
success. This raises the question whether the presence or absence of democratic corporatist structures 
actually influences the economic performance of some of Europe’s smallest states.  
As small states are vulnerable in the international economy, especially during an economic crisis, it 
is important for them to identify the domestic factors that can contribute to their ability to withstand 
economic shocks. Therefore, testing the applicability of Katzenstein’s theory on the smallest states of 
Europe can be valuable for small states, as it provides them with information on whether domestic 
democratic corporatist structures are useful or not in improving their economic resilience. In order to clarify 
the causal claims made by Katzenstein, this thesis will analyse the relationship between democratic 
corporatism and economic performance for seven European small states: Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia – during and after the economic crisis of 2008. 
 
Small states in the international economy 
As a field of social science, political science seeks to provide general theories with wide application. 
Therefore, it should take all its cases seriously (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p.28). However, under the realist 
premise that great power states have the capabilities to influence the international system, large states have 
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traditionally received more attention in the discipline of international relations. Small states have largely been 
neglected because of their “supposedly insignificant role in international politics” (Veenendaal & Corbett, 
2015, p.527). This is a shortcoming for the discipline. Small states can provide valuable information, as their 
political structures often deviate from those of larger states (Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015; Katzenstein, 
1985). Studying small states therefore provides an opportunity to test and question existing knowledge about 
international relations.  
 The (neo-)realists who considered small states in their research – mainly scholars who were based 
in small countries – found that small states have to adjust to the rules of the game, which are primarily 
prescribed by big states (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p.17-19). These assumptions resulted in the 
conventional wisdom that small states cannot independently influence international politics and that the 
foreign policy behaviour of small states is determined by the international system (Hey, 2003, p.6). However, 
various scholars have challenged this traditional understanding by asserting that domestic factors, rather 
than international factors, might in fact provide a better explanation for small state behaviour (East, 1973; 
Elman, 1995).  
 The (neo-)realist approach stresses power capabilities and state security issues, and therefore 
focuses on the balance of power in a system level-analysis (Hey, 2003, p.8). In the 1970s, neoliberal 
institutionalism made room for a new focus on economic interdependence and cooperation. This 
contributed to a higher level of attention for small states, as the global economy is an important policy area 
for these countries (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p.11). Still, many economists stressed the weak economic 
position of small states. Given that many developing countries are small, the general view holds that 
smallness is a constraint on economic success and that small states have little influence on international 
organisations and decision-making in the international political economy (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p.13).  
Indeed, small states possess several characteristics that are presumably disadvantageous for their 
economic performance. Firstly, states with a small area often lack (a diverse) supply of raw materials and 
natural resources (Streeten, 1993, p.197). Consequently, they are primarily dependent on imports (Briguglio, 
1995, p.1616). Furthermore, small states have a small domestic market. This causes them to depend on 
export markets, while policies of import-substitution are also limited (Briguglio, 1995, p.1616). Moreover, 
small states have limited possibilities to exploit economies of scale. Small states can overcome this deficit 
with export-oriented policies, but they still have to concentrate on just one or a few export products with 
comparative advantage (Streeten, 1993, p.198). Altogether, these characteristics often result in less 
diversified economic structures, making small states dependent on international trade and thus on economic 
conditions in the rest of the world (Kuznets, 1960). In turn, this means that small states are more vulnerable 
to unexpected shocks in international trade and other adverse economic changes. It follows that there is a 
dominant assumption that small states have a weak economic position.  
Nevertheless, several studies have shown that empirically, a lot of small states do not meet the 
expectations of weak economic performance. Both in terms of growth rates and per capita incomes, small 
states perform equally well and sometimes even better than large states (Armstrong & Read, 1998; Easterly 
& Kraay, 2000). So apparently, some small states are able to cope with their vulnerable position in the 
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international economic system quite well. In the classic study Small States in World Markets (1985), Peter 
Katzenstein has made a major contribution to the understanding of why this is the case, by analysing how 
seven small states in Europe (Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and 
Austria) coped with the economic dislocations in the global economy of the 1980s, such as the oil crisis and 
increasing competition from Third World countries. He suggested that small state policy could even contain 
some important lessons for other states, including countries with big power capabilities.  
According to Katzenstein (1985), small states are indeed more dependent on world markets because 
of their small size. Their economic openness makes them vulnerable to sudden changes in international 
economic conditions. Even though all states, including large ones, must find strategies to cope with global 
economic changes, small states lack the ability to adopt protectionist policies like large states often do in 
response to adverse economic change. Instead, small states adopt flexible policies of adjustment, by 
combining economic openness with domestic compensation for the victims of instabilities in investment 
and employment, such as investment reserves and subsidies, a national incomes policy, or social security 
expenditures (Katzenstein, 1985, p.48–56). These compensatory policies reduce the uncertainty stemming 
from market fluctuations. 
In the seven small states analysed by Katzenstein, these policies proved to be successful – both in 
terms of economic performance and political legitimacy and stability. Katzenstein’s yardstick for success or 
failure “measures the extent to which social coalitions, political institutions and public policies facilitate or 
impede shifts in the factors of production that increase economic efficiency with due regard to the 
requirements of political legitimacy” and Katzenstein suggests that small states successfully adjust to 
economic change “through a carefully calibrated balance of economic flexibility and political stability” 
(Katzenstein, 1985, p.29). This is made possible by domestic structures of democratic corporatism. 
Conversely, small states that adopt a liberal agenda and lack a framework of democratic corporatism, run 
the risk of being more vulnerable to economic changes and political disorder. In short, “for the small 
European states, economic change is a fact of life” and therefore “they live with change by compensating 
for it” (Katzenstein, 1985, p.24). The key to success is a framework of democratic corporatism. This concept 
will be elaborated on in the following paragraph.  
 
Conceptualization of democratic corporatism 
Democratic corporatism is an ambiguous concept, as there is no general agreement on the definition of it 
in the literature. Neither is there consensus on the central elements that constitute corporatism (Williamson, 
1989). Generally, corporatist systems can be contrasted with pluralist systems, in which the influence of 
lobby groups and associations on a government’s socio-economic policy is widely dispersed. Consequently, 
interest groups are constantly in competition with each other over the amount of public revenue that will 
be devoted to them (Williamson, 1989, p.53–54). In corporatist systems, on the other hand, labour 
organizations are highly involved in the decision-making of socio-economic policies. The goal of these 
structures is to limit (social) conflict in society (Thorhallsson & Kattel, 2013, p.88). As this thesis aims to 
test the applicability of Katzenstein’s theory, his own definition of democratic corporatism will be used. 
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Katzenstein places democratic corporatism in between two other political forms of capitalism: 
liberalism and statism. Liberal countries, such as the United States and Great Britain, rely on macro-
economic policies and market solutions, and respond to economic adversity with protectionist policies 
(Katzenstein, 1985, p.23). Democratic corporatist states also have liberal market economies, but substitute 
political mechanisms of compromise for dictates of the market (Katzenstein, 1985, p.133). In statist 
countries, like Japan and France, the government assists firms to become competitive and helps industry 
prepare for international competition (Katzenstein, 1985, p.26). In corporatist countries, state bureaucracies 
also have an important place in the market policy, but these state institutions are relatively neutral and have 
limited institutional autonomy and political interest of their own (Katzenstein, 1985, p.133).  
Democratic corporatism is defined as “the voluntary, cooperative regulation of conflicts over 
economic and social issues through highly structured and interpenetrating political relationships between 
business, trade unions and the state, augmented by political parties” (Katzenstein, 1985, p.32). Katzenstein 
identified three main characteristics of corporatism, namely 1)an ideology of social partnership expressed at 
the national level, 2)a relatively centralized and concentrated system of interest groups and 3)a political 
bargaining framework in which important interest groups participate in policy formation. These 
characteristics enhance the ability of (small) states to reach compromise and consensus. According to 
Lijphart & Crepaz (1991), consensus democracy and corporatism are highly related. The need for coalition 
or minority governments – commonly caused by an electoral system of proportional representation – is an 
important condition facilitating corporatist compromise (Katzenstein, 1985, p.156-157). Coalition 
governments create a system of consensual decision-making as they encourage sharing of power among 
political opponents and provide opposition parties with influence over policy formation. Such a political 
culture of consensus enhances the prospects of corporatist compromise. 
 
Small states, democratic corporatism and economic performance 
Katzenstein’s analysis of how small states cope with their vulnerability in the international economy has had 
a major influence on the fields of international political economy and comparative politics and it remains to 
be of great importance in small state studies (Ingebritsen, 2010). Generally, the scholarly literature on 
corporatism supports Katzenstein’s argument that corporatism positively affects the macro-economic 
performance of (small) states. High growth, low unemployment and low inflation rates are found to be more 
common in states with corporatist structures and consensual democracies than in states with pluralist 
systems and majoritarian democracies (Lijphart & Crepaz, 1991, p.236; Wilensky, 2006). However, there is 
no uniform understanding of the consequences of corporatism, as “there is little evidence that corporatism 
matters as a determinant of economic outcomes” (Therborn, 1987). Some scholars claim that the efficacy 
of corporatist structures as a device for crisis management is in decline (Lijphart & Crepaz, 1991, p.237). 
According to Vis, Woldendorp & Keman (2012), corporatism accounts for policy formation and 
implementation, rather than economic performance.  
In Small States in World Markets (1985), Katzenstein analysed seven states that were considered small 
at the time: Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Austria. Indeed, they 
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were relatively small in comparison with the large countries that had – until then – dominated research on 
international relations and the international political economy. However, setting the bar at the population 
size of the biggest of these states at present day – The Netherlands with 17 million inhabitants – would 
mean that only ten states in Europe (Russia, Germany, Turkey, France, Great Britain, Italy, Ukraine, Spain, 
Poland and Romania) are not considered small (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p.6). There is no generally agreed 
definition of small states in the literature of small state studies (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p.9), but it can 
be argued that nowadays, the states analysed by Katzenstein would be identified as middle power states 
rather than small states. From this perspective, one could expect that even smaller countries might be more 
vulnerable to economic changes than the states analysed by Katzenstein, and, therefore, these smaller states 
are the most likely cases in which a framework of democratic corporatism is necessary to deal with economic 
change.  
Recent studies have shown that some of these smaller European states have not adopted 
Katzenstein’s framework. Kuokštis (2015) asserts that Estonia lacks corporatist structures and domestic 
compensation policies. Thorhallsson (2010) showed that corporatist structures in Iceland never fully 
developed and that Icelandic decision-making continues to be characterized by conflict rather than 
consensus. Thorhallsson & Kattel (2013) claim that the lack of corporatist structures in both Iceland and 
Estonia helps to explain why they were highly vulnerable to the economic crisis of 2008.  
These studies have shown that some of Europe’s smallest states lacking corporatist structures have 
not fared well during the crisis. However, it cannot easily be determined whether the lack of corporatist 
structures is the (main) explanation for this. For example, Thorhallsson (2011) has argued that – in addition 
to buffers from within – external shelter, such as membership of the European Union, is necessary for small 
states to be resilient in times of economic crisis. Furthermore, it has not yet become clear whether some of 
the smallest European states that fit the democratic corporatism framework have performed better. This 
raises the question whether non-corporatist small states are in fact less able to cope with changes in the 
international economy than corporatist small states.  
King, Keohane & Verba (1995) have offered one of the main critiques on Katzenstein’s work, 
namely that it avoids the issue of causal inference of the relationship between democratic corporatism and 
economic success: “Because of selection bias induced by his decision to study only successful cases, 
Katzenstein cannot rule out an important alternative causal hypothesis – that any of a variety of other factors 
accounts for this uniform pattern” (King, Keohane & Verba, 1995, p.478). So by selecting his cases on the 
dependent variable, some of Katzenstein’s claims remain unsupported. Katzenstein’s historical analysis is a 
valuable contribution for understanding the economic success of his seven cases, but by suggesting that 
democratic corporatism may contain lessons for large states, he seems to make the normative claim that 
democratic corporatism helps macro-economic performance in any case. When the issue of causal inference 
is not addressed, it is important to be careful with such implicit recommendations. Katzenstein has 
responded to this critique by admitting that “Small States would have been a better book had it pushed harder 
on an underdeveloped part of the analysis, either through further empirical work, by adding more cases, or 
through better developed counterfactual reasoning” (Katzenstein, 2003, p.13). This thesis aims to do both, 
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by studying the explanatory power of the absence or presence of democratic corporatism in seven most 
likely cases that were not included in Katzenstein’s research.  
 
Research question 
Katzenstein claims that the economic success of the seven small states he analysed could be explained by 
their domestic democratic corporatist structures. As there are much smaller states in Europe than his seven 
cases, this raises the question whether his theory is also applicable to those most likely cases – especially 
because not all of them have adopted a democratic corporatist framework. Furthermore, the theory of 
Katzenstein suggests that democratic corporatism might contain important lessons for (big) states, while he 
remains inexplicit about the causal inference of the relationship between corporatism and macro-economic 
performance. Therefore, this thesis puts Katzenstein’s theory under scrutiny, by testing its applicability in 
the economic crisis of 2008. This particular crisis is suitable to analyse the different responses of small states, 
because all European states have (to a more or lesser extent) been impacted by this crisis. This thesis aims 
to answer the following research question: To what extent can democratic corporatism explain differences 
in the economic resilience of small European states during and after the 2008 crisis? The answer of this 
question might be valuable for small states, because it clarifies whether the lessons from Small States in World 
Markets are also applicable to them in the contemporary economy.  
 
Expectations 
On the basis of Katzenstein’s theory, three general expectations can be formulated. First, Katzenstein 
suggests that structures of democratic corporatism contribute to the economic resilience of small states 
when they are faced with economic adversity. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that small European states 
without (strong) democratic corporatist structures have been hit harder in terms of macro-economic 
performance during the economic crisis of 2008, than small states with (strong) democratic corporatist 
structures. Alternatively, different compositions of their economies might also explain diverging economic 
performances.  
 Second, Katzenstein claims that the domestic structures of small states are an important explanation 
for their political strategies. Democratic corporatism enables small states to adopt policies of domestic 
compensation, which improves their ability to respond to and recover from economic shocks in a successful 
way. Hence, the second expectation is that small states with (strong) democratic corporatist structures 
adopted policies of domestic compensation in response to the economic crisis, while the governments of 
small states without (strong) democratic corporatist adopted policies that were less compensatory. 
 Third, Katzenstein’s yardstick for success or failure also includes political stability and legitimacy. 
Democratic corporatism encourages concertation with the social partners, resulting in consensual policies. 
Therefore, the third expectation is that small states with (strong) democratic corporatist structures pursued 
policies based on consensus resulting in high political and social stability, whereas the governments of small 
states without (strong) democratic corporatist pursued their anti-crisis policies unilaterally, resulting in 
political and social instability.  
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Operationalization 
Katzenstein (1985, p.34) stresses that characteristics of democratic corporatism can be found in all advanced 
industrial states, but that one can distinguish between “strong” and “weak” systems of democratic 
corporatism. This indicates that states can be ranked according to their scores of democratic corporatism. 
For the operationalization of democratic corporatism, several indicators will be selected from the database 
provided by Visser (2015). This is a comprehensive database on institutional characteristics of trade unions, 
wage setting, state intervention and social pacts in 51 countries between 1960 and 2014. However, only a 
few indicators in the database are relevant for the measurement of the features of democratic corporatism. 
The selected indicators and the ranking of the seven cases will be discussed later in the thesis.  
The Economic Performance Index (EPI), developed by Khramov & Lee (2012) for the IMF, will 
be used to operationalize macro-economic performance. The EPI is a comprehensive index which gives an 
overall image of the economic stance of a state. Simply looking at GDP is not enough, as this does not 
always reflect the effects on e.g. the labour market (Tridico, 2013). The EPI is composed of 1)the inflation 
rate measuring the economy’s monetary stance, 2)the unemployment rate measuring the economy’s 
production stance, 3)the budget deficit as a percentage of total GDP measuring the economy’s fiscal stance 
and 4)the change in real GDP measuring the aggregate performance of the entire economy. These 
indicators, except for the last one, were also used by Katzenstein to measure economic performance. Data 
provided by Eurostat (2016) on these four indicators will be used to calculate the EPI of the seven small 
states before, during and after the crisis, using the appropriate formula.1 
 
Research design and methodology 
This thesis provides a nested analysis in a mixed methods research design, following the guidelines provided 
by Lieberman (2005). This strategy combines case-study analysis with statistical analysis. The preliminary 
quantitative analysis both provides insights in the strength of the relationship between democratic 
corporatism and economic resilience, and guides the case selection for the qualitative analysis – in which 
specific explanations of individual cases can be explored (Lieberman, 2005, p.436). The nested analysis is 
particularly suitable for making causal inferences (Lieberman, 2005, p.437) and triangulation offers greater 
validity of the results (Bryman, 2012, p.633).  
 In the quantitative analysis, the first hypothesis will be tested by analyzing the correlation between 
the corporatist ranks of the seven cases and their decrease in economic performance during the crisis. The 
decrease in economic performance represents the impact of the crisis on the economies, and will be 
calculated by comparing the maximum EPI-score of the seven states before the 2008 crisis with their 
minimum EPI-scores during the crisis. A bivariate analysis, using Spearman's rank-order correlation 
coefficient, can be used to test the strength and direction of the assumed unidirectional relationship between 
the dependent variable (economic performance) and indicators of democratic corporatism as explanatory 
                                                          
1 The formula developed by Khramov & Lee for calculating the EPI is: 100% - (Inf(%)-0.0%) - (Unem(%)-4.75%) - 
(Def/GDP(%)-0.0%) + (ΔGDP(%)-4.75%).  
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variables (Argyrous, 2011, p.245). The Spearman's rank-order correlation coefficient is calculated by ranking 
the sample for each variable and then comparing these ranks (Argyrous, 2011, p.246–247). As the theory of 
Katzenstein is explicit on the direction of the relationship (democratic corporatism explains economic 
performance), a one-tail sided test can be used. The correlation will be presented in a scatter plot and from 
this figure, cases will be selected for further qualitative analysis.  
 The qualitative analysis will be used to further explore the causal link between the two variables, 
and to test the second hypothesis on the link between democratic corporatism and anti-crisis policy 
responses and the third hypothesis on the link between democratic corporatism and political stability. The 
qualitative analysis will be executed through a content analysis of scientific studies on the selected cases and 
reports provided by national banks and trade unions, the OECD and several agencies of the European 
Union, such as the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(Eurofound) and the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI).  
 
Case selection 
The vulnerable position of small states in the international economy is caused by their economic openness 
– which is inherently linked to their small domestic markets. According to Katzenstein, domestic structures 
of democratic corporatism will help these small states to cope with their vulnerable position. As this thesis 
aims to study the effects of this domestic factor, the effect of external shelter on small state resilience is 
excluded by only selecting cases that are a member of the European Union.  
 
Table 1: Smallness and economic openness of selected cases  
 Population (2013) Exports/GDP (2013) 
Cyprus 865,878 58,7% 
Estonia 1,320,174 84,5% 
Latvia  2,023,825 61,3% 
Lithuania   2,971,905 84% 
Luxembourg 537,039 192,1% 
Malta  421,364 158,2% 
Slovenia 2,058,821 75,2% 
Source: Eurostat (2016) 
 
Therefore, seven EU-member states have been selected by their small size and open economies. Size can 
be measured on the basis of population size, and the bar for smallness is set at a population of 3 million 
inhabitants. Economic openness can be measured by the export of goods and services as a percentage of 
the GDP. This leaves the selection with seven states: Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta 
and Slovenia. Table 1 shows that the seven selected cases are both small and have very open economies, 
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indicating their economic vulnerability. These are the most likely cases for the applicability of Katzenstein’s 
framework, and they therefore constitute a good sample to test his theory.  
 
Quantitative analysis  
Operationalization and ranking of democratic corporatism 
As noted above, democratic corporatism has three main characteristics. The first characteristic, an ideology 
of social partnership, indicates a political culture in which the social partners prefer consensus and 
compromise over competition. This feature can hardly be expressed in quantitative data. Moreover, an 
ideology of social partnership can also be regarded as a favourable condition for the development of the 
other corporatist characteristics, rather than being a main feature of democratic corporatism. After all, an 
ideology of social partnership and the third characteristic of “voluntary, informal and continuous” political 
bargaining are highly related. For these reasons, an ideology of social partnership will not be included in the 
quantitative analysis of corporatism, but it will be covered by the qualitative analysis on the selected cases.  
From the database provided by Visser (2015), eight measurements have been selected to measure 
the remaining characteristics of democratic corporatism. The second characteristic of democratic 
corporatism can be split into two indicators of democratic corporatism, namely 1)the centralization of 
interest groups in peak organizations and 2)the concentration of these interest. A framework for collective 
(political) bargaining constitutes the third characteristic. The selected indicators are presented in the table 2 
below.  
The first measurement (I) is concerned with the formal hierarchical control of union confederations 
at peak and sectoral level. It is a summary measure of the authority of confederations over its affiliates and 
of the unions over their local or workplace branches. It is a continuous index and varies from 0 to 1. 
Unfortunately, Visser’s database does not provide the same measure for employers’ organizations. 
Therefore, the second measurement (II) concerns the number of employers’ confederations. A small 
number employers’ organizations indicates a relatively higher level of centralization than a large number of 
organizations. The third measurement (III) reflects the predominant level on which wage bargaining takes 
place. This indicator is selected because bargaining will take place on higher levels when the peak 
organizations have more hierarchical control. Visser (2015) has coded this measurement in the following 
way: 1 = bargaining predominately takes place at the local or company level; 2 = intermediate or alternating 
between sector and company bargaining; 3 = bargaining predominantly takes place at the sector or industry 
level; 4 = intermediate or alternating between central and industry bargaining; 5 = bargaining predominantly 
takes places at central or cross-industry level. 
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Table 2. Indicators measuring democratic corporatism   
Characteristics of corporatism  Measurement  
Centralization of interest groups (I) Authority of Union Confederations 
(II) Number of Employers’ Organizations 
(III) Level of Wage Bargaining 
Concentration of interest groups (IV) Employers’ Organization Density 
(V) Union Density  
(VI) Collective (wage) bargaining coverage  
Bargaining Framework (VII) Tripartite Council 
(VIII) Routine Involvement  
 
The concentration of interest groups is a measure of the degree of inclusiveness (Katzenstein, 1985, p.33). 
The employers’ organization density rate (IV) expresses the percentage of employees in firms organised in 
employers’ organizations. The union density rate (V) indicates net union membership as a proportion of all 
wage and salary earners in employment. However, non-member employees might still be covered by a 
collective wage agreement. Therefore, the sixth measurement (VI) shows the percentage of employees 
covered by collective wage bargaining agreements, as a proportion of all employees – irrespective of whether 
they are organized in a trade union or not. 
 The existence of a bargaining framework is measured by two indicators. Firstly, measurement VII 
expresses the existence of a standard (institutionalized) tripartite council concerning social and economic 
policy. The values of this indicator are coded by Visser (2015) in the following way: 0 = No permanent 
council; 1 = Council with various social interest representatives, including unions and employers; 2 = 
Tripartite Council with representation from the trade unions, employers’ associations, and government(-
appointed) representatives. The final measurement (VIII) expresses the routine involvement of unions and 
employers in government decisions on social and economic policy, regardless of the existence of a formal 
tripartite council: 0 = No concertation, involvement is rare or absent; 1 = Partial concertation, irregular and 
infrequent involvement; 2 = Full concertation, regular and frequent involvement. 
In order to rank the seven cases on their scores of democratic corporatism, the average scores on 
the selected indicators over the time period of 2005 – 2014 have been calculated. These mean scores and 
their corresponding ranks are presented in tables 3, 4 and 5. Table 6 displays the sum of these ranks. The 
state with the lowest value, Luxembourg, has the strongest corporatist structures, followed by Slovenia, 
Cyprus and Malta. The Baltic states score lowest on the indicators of democratic corporatism. Following 
the first hypothesis, the states with (strong) corporatist structures are expected to have been hit less hard 
during the crisis, than the states without or with weaker corporatist structures. This correlation will be tested 
in the following paragraph.  
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Table 3. Centralization of interest groups  
 
Authority of union confederations (I) Number of employers' 
organizations (II) 
Level of wage bargaining (III) 
Mean score Rank Mean number Rank Mean score Rank 
 
Cyprus ,30 3,5 2,00 3,0 1,83 3,0 
Estonia ,25 5,0 3,00 5,0 1,00 5,5 
Latvia ,20 6,5 2,00 3,0 1,00 5,5 
Lithuania ,20 6,5 2,00 3,0 1,00 5,5 
Luxembourg ,40 1,0 1,00 1,0 2,40 2,0 
Malta ,30 3,5 3,30 6,0 1,00 5,5 
Slovenia 35 2,0 4,90 7,0 3,50 1,0 
Source: Visser (2015), calculations by author  
 
Table 4. Concentration of interest groups  
Source: Visser (2015), calculations by author  
 
Table 5. Bargaining framework  
 
Tripartite Council (VII) Routine Involvement (VIII) 
Mean score Rank Mean score Rank 
Cyprus 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Slovenia 
,00 7,0 2,00 1,5 
,10 6,0 1,00 5,5 
2,00 2,5 1,00 5,5 
2,00 2,5 1,00 5,5 
2,00 2,5 2,00 1,5 
1,00 5,0 1,00 5,5 
2,00 2,5 1,50 3,0 
Source: Visser (2015), calculations by author  
 
 
 
Employers' organization density rate 
(IV) 
Union density rate (V) Collective (wage) bargaining agreements 
coverage (VI) 
Mean % Rank Mean % Rank Mean % Rank 
 
Cyprus 62,50 3,0 52,72 2,0 50,04 4,0 
Estonia 24,20 6,0 7,63 7,0 24,00 5,0 
Latvia 33,68 5,0 15,05 5,0 17,44 6,0 
Lithuania 16,13 7,0 9,84 6,0 10,82 7,0 
Luxembourg 80,00 2,0 36,76 3,0 58,57 3,0 
Malta 60,00 4,0 53,96 1,0 61,55 2,0 
Slovenia 85,50 1,0 26,86 4,0 84,89 1,0 
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Table 6. Corporatism ranks   
 
Sum of ranks of columns (I) 
– (VIII) in tables 3, 4 and 5. 
Corporatism rank 
Cyprus 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Slovenia 
27,0 
45,0 
39,0 
43,0 
16,0 
32,5 
21,5 
3 
7 
5 
6 
1 
4 
2 
 
Economic performance and corporatism 
Figure 1 shows the EPI of the seven cases from 2005 – 2014. After most states performed best in 2007 
(except for Estonia and Latvia in 2006), the economies of all seven cases have been impacted by the 
economic crisis starting in 2008. The Baltic states have been hit hard in particular. And while most states hit 
their low-point in 2009, in Cyprus and Slovenia the crisis lingered and impacted their economies most in 
2013. Figure 2 displays the relationship between corporatism and the decrease in economic performance 
during the crisis, for each of the seven cases.  
This result generates a Spearman’s rank-order correlation of 0,679 between the sum of corporatism 
ranks and the EPI decreases of the seven states. This means that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between democratic corporatism and the impact of the crisis on the economic performance of the small 
states (p = 0.047). Therefore, the first hypothesis can be confirmed: overall, the economies of the small 
European states with relatively weak democratic corporatist structures have been hit harder in terms of 
macro-economic performance during the crisis of 2008 than small European states with stronger democratic 
corporatist structures. The Baltic states have been hit hard in particular, while they also have the weakest 
corporatist structures. Furthermore, the states with strong corporatist structures, Slovenia and Luxembourg, 
performed relatively well.  
From these results, it is not yet possible to conclude that the statistically significant correlation 
between democratic corporatism and the impact of the crisis also represents a causal link between these 
variables. The differences in the composition of the economies constitutes a potential alternative 
explanation. According to the Central Bank of Malta (2016), the diversification of the Maltese economy in 
the years before the crisis has contributed to its resilience during the crisis, as it made the economy less 
vulnerable to industry-specific disturbances. Obviously, industry-specific disturbance was more severe in 
Cyprus and Luxembourg, as they have a large financial sector. The main difference was that domestic banks 
in Cyprus held much more banking assets than domestic banks in Luxembourg (Stephanou, 2011).  
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Figure 1: Economic performance of small states during the crisis   
 
Figure 2: EPI decrease and degree of corporatism   
 
 
Still, the presence or absence of democratic corporatism may have influenced the ability of the seven small 
states to recover from the economic crisis. As the statistically significant results are robust, the case study 
analysis should be focused on testing the model (Lieberman, 2005). Therefore, the case selection should be 
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based on the widest degree of variation on the independent variable. So Luxembourg and Estonia, with 
respectively the strongest and the weakest democratic corporatist structures, are selected as two extreme 
cases, and can therefore be used as confirmatory case studies (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p.300). They 
might contribute to our understanding on the extent to which the absence or presence of democratic 
corporatism makes small states more resilient or vulnerable. Furthermore, figure 2 displays Malta as an 
outlier: the Maltese economy has been hit least hard by the crisis, while its corporatist structures are relatively 
weak. An exploratory case study on this deviant case might give some insights into why Malta does not seem 
to fit Katzenstein’s theory (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p.302). 
 
Qualitative analysis  
Luxembourg: economy and corporatism in crisis 
Luxembourg’s strong democratic corporatist structures correspond with its political culture of consensus. 
The proportional electoral system has caused a need to form coalition governments. Consequently, political 
competition is limited and political parties have refrained from radical policy changes (Dumont, Kies & 
Portier, 2010a, p.126). This has fuelled an ideology of social partnership, which is clearly present in the so-
called ‘Luxembourg social model’. This model “combines continuous, institutionalized dialogue among 
industry, unions and the government to produce low inequality, an adequate redistribution of the fruits of 
economic growth and industrial peace” (Hirsch, 2010). Table 3 shows that the interest groups are highly 
centralized. The density rate of union membership is relatively low (36,76%) compared to the density rate 
of employers’ organizations (80%), but the majority of the employees (58,57%) is covered by collective wage 
bargaining agreements (table 4). Furthermore, there are tripartite consultation bodies that constitute a formal 
political bargaining framework, guaranteeing permanent social dialogue between employers, employees and 
government (table 5). The most important corporatist institution is the National Tripartite Committee 
(NTC) in which government, employers and unions are engaged in policy-making on issues linked with 
labour market regulation, incomes and fiscal policies and social security (Dumont & Hirsch, 2003). In this 
institutionalised and permanent platform for social dialogue, decision-making is highly consensual (Dumont 
& Kies, 2013). It thereby fulfils its purpose of easing parliamentary approval for major policy changes. Based 
on the hypotheses of this thesis, it is expected that these strong democratic corporatist structures have 
helped Luxembourg to cope with the economic crisis.  
 Indeed, Luxembourg has weathered the crisis relatively well and the effects of the crisis have been 
less severe than in other small countries with large financial sectors, such as Cyprus (Clauwaert, Schömann, 
Buetten & Rasnača, 2016, p.1). According to the OECD (2012, p.12), the impact of the crisis on the 
economy of Luxembourg has been limited due to its “stable and well trusted institutions built on a culture 
of consensual decision-making”. The main crisis management policies included monetary and financial 
measures, short working subsidies that dampened the rise in unemployment, and fiscal stimulus measures, 
such as public investments and higher social benefits (OECD, 2012). The corporatist institutions and 
mechanisms have been utilized to adopt these policies of domestic compensation. At the beginning of the 
crisis in 2009, the government consulted with the social partners to adopt a support plan intended to help 
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companies in difficulty (Guyet, Tarren & Triomphe, 2012, p.76). Measures included state loan guarantees 
and subsidies for employers so that companies could maintain their personnel with a shorter work-time 
scheme, compensating for the employee’s lost salaries (Clauwaert et al., 2016, p.2). Furthermore, 
government intervention in the two severely damaged banks Dexia and Fortis was based on consensus and 
received high domestic support (Dumont, Kies & Poirier, 2009).  
However, the consensual democratic corporatism model was also challenged during the crisis. The 
pre-crisis growth of the financial sector – which accounts for one-third of the GDP – had led to an 
increasingly unequal distribution of labour income. The economic crisis exposed the dependence of the 
social transfer system on the volatile financial sector (OECD, 2012). In May 2009, trade unions organized 
a massive protest of 30.000 people in Luxembourg city against threats to dismantle the social security system 
(Guyet et al., 2012; Dumont, Kies & Poirier, 2010b). Furthermore, in April 2010, discussions on wage 
indexation in the NTC failed. This was the first serious breach in tripartite dialogue since 1982 (Broughton 
& Welz, 2013, p.16). The main problem was that the government submitted its Stability and Growth Pact 
for 2009 – 2014 to the European Commission before consulting these issues with the social partners first 
(Hirsch, 2010). Eventually the deadlock was solved through a bipartite agreement between the government 
and the national trade unions in September 2010. However, subsequent negotiations between the 
government and the employers’ organisations failed again (Dumont, Kies & Poirier, 2011).  
The Luxembourg social model turned out to be fragile during times of crisis. Slovenia, which also 
has relatively strong corporatist structures, experienced similar developments. When the crisis hit Slovenia, 
the government initially implemented some successful short-term anti-crisis measures aimed at job 
protection and burden-sharing – most of which were consulted with the social partners (Feldmann, 2017). 
However, tripartite consultations on long-term anti-crisis measures in November 2009 also failed, which 
lead to even higher social unrest in Slovenia, after which the government had to resign in 2011 
(Guardiancich, 2010, p.110). So even though the corporatist structures initially helped Luxembourg and 
Slovenia to adopt some effective anti-crisis measures, the crisis also exposed the fragility of these structures. 
As a consequence, the political performance of these governments was not as resilient as one would expect 
based on their relatively strong corporatist structures and their policies of domestic compensation.  
 
Estonia: the crisis as an opportunity for euro adoption 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states adopted liberal market economies, which – marked 
by their high GDP growth up until 2007 – initially proved to be successful for their economic development. 
Their neoliberal economies left little room for the development of democratic corporatism. Tables 3 and 4 
show that the interest groups are decentralized and that few employers and employees are represented by 
organizations. The Estonian union confederations are splintered between rival organizations, and most 
companies play no part in employers’ organizations (Woolfson & Kalleste, 2011, p.59). The involvement of 
the social partners in tripartite social dialogue is irregular and infrequent (table 5), and when it takes place, 
consultations have little substantive content (Woolfson & Kalleste, 2011, p.60). Ost (2011) used the label of 
‘illusionary corporatism’ to describe the tripartite arrangements in the Eastern European countries, because, 
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according to him, tripartite arrangements in these states were used as “a façade for introducing neoliberal 
policies undermining labour interests” (p.19).  
Accordingly, tripartite consultations and former tripartite agreements were easily put aside by the 
Estonian government during the crisis. Figure 1 shows that the Estonian economy was hit severely by the 
crisis, and several case studies indicate that Estonia reacted to the crisis with a hardening of the neoliberal 
policy paradigm (Woolfson & Kalleste, 2011; Kattel & Raudla, 2013). According to Raudla & Kattel (2011), 
the neoliberal and non-interventionist tradition had given Estonia few possibilities to build bureaucratic and 
political capacities of macro-management. “Hence, when faced with major economic shock, the idea of 
actively steering the economy out of the crisis appeared rather alien” (Raudla & Kattel, 2011, p.182).  
Instead, the Estonian response to the crisis was predominantly aimed at pursuing its desire to join 
the European monetary union (EMU). Therefore, Estonia pegged its currency to the euro and consequently, 
devaluation was no longer a policy option (Kallaste & Woolfson, 2013). In addition, Estonia implemented 
radical budgetary retrenchment measures, aimed at cutting expenditures in public sector wages, investments 
and social security, while increasing taxes (Raudla & Kattel, 2011). In comparison with the policies of 
domestic compensation in Luxembourg, which as a member of the EMU could also not opt for a 
devaluation, the Estonian response was much less egalitarian. The economic shock impacted the labour 
market in particular. In 2010, unemployment rates reached 16,7% in Estonia (compared to 5,1% in 
Luxembourg), while those still employed also faced difficulties because of the wage cuts. In all three Baltic 
states, the flexible labour market functioned as the primary adjustment mechanism during the crisis: “The 
public sector […] absorbed the crisis mainly through wage cuts, while the rest of the economy bore the 
brunt of job cuts” (Kalleste & Woolfson, 2013, p.258).  
The social partners were basically ignored in the introduction of these austerity measures. In 2008, 
the Estonian government involved the social partners in the development of a new labour contract law. The 
government agreed to increase unemployment compensation in return for a new firing policy that made it 
easier for companies to fire employees. However, the eventual bill proposed by the government only 
included the new firing policy, while the promises on compensation policies were simply abandoned (Ost, 
2011, p.43). One tripartite agreement was adopted in 2009, but it was mainly about vocational training, and 
it had nothing to do with the austerity measures (Kallaste & Woolfson, 2013).  
Even though the Estonian government unilaterally pursued its austerity measures, they proved to 
be successful in terms of fiscal consolidation and restoration of investor’s confidence (Vilpišauskas & 
Kuokštis, 2010). In 2009, Estonia was one of the five European countries that met the Maastricht debt and 
deficit criteria (Raudla & Kattel, 2011, p.164), and it became a member of the Eurozone in the aftermath of 
the crisis in 2011. The Estonian labour market had to take a blow, but in contrast to the protests in for 
example Greece, the austerity measures in Estonia did not result in significant political discontent or chaos. 
An important reason for this is that civil society, such as trade unions, are underdeveloped in Estonia and 
thus could not organize large protests. Furthermore, the crisis-exit strategy of Eurozone-entry provided a 
specific goal for the government, that could easily be communicated to the public and its success could 
easily be measured by the Maastricht criteria (Kattel & Raudla, 2013). The trust in the government remained 
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high under the Estonian population and despite the heavy budget cuts and high levels of unemployment, 
the government was re-elected during the 2011 elections. The other two Baltic states seem to fit the third 
hypothesis better, as economic adjustment turned out to be much less successful and trust in the Latvian 
and Lithuanian government decreased (Vilpišauskas & Kuokštis, 2010). Nevertheless, the social unrest in 
all three Baltic states did not exceed the social unrest experienced in Luxembourg or Slovenia.  
 
Malta: micro-economic adjustment in a micro-state  
Malta deviates from the pattern displayed in figure 2, as it was hit least hard despite its relatively weak 
corporatist structures. Malta’s lack of corporatist structures can be explained by its highly polarized politics, 
which is characterized by a two-party system in which the Nationalist Party and the Labour Party dominate 
the national elections and alternate in majoritarian governments (Baldacchino, 2002; Cini, 2002; Hirczy, 
1995). These have been generally stable governments, but it also means that Maltese government can 
generally ignore opposition demands (Pace, 2002, p.34). The two principal unions, the GWU and UHM, 
have traditional affiliations with the two main political parties. Consequently, the influence of these groups 
on government policy has fluctuated with the alternation of the parties in government (Harwood, 2014, 
p.218-219). Even though most employees and employers are represented by a union (table 4), the ideological 
divide between the trade unions prevents them from uniting their efforts and collectively bargain with 
employers’ organizations (Lafoucriere & Green, 2006).  
Attempts to institutionalize social dialogue in Malta have not brought about a spirit of social 
partnership. For example, the Labour Party refused to take place in the Malta-EU Action Steering 
Committee, in which 130 interest groups could discuss and approve negotiation position papers during the 
Maltese bid for EU-membership before its accession (Pace, 2011). This reflects the polarized political 
environment. Furthermore, the Malta Council for Economic and Social Development (MCESD) acts as an 
advisory council that issues recommendations, but it is not involved in the implementation of policies. Its 
advisory function has also been challenged, as complaints have been voiced that the government fails to 
consult with the economic partners in the MCESD (Harwood, 2014, p.219) – which is also reflected in table 
5, column VIII. Overall, high trust relationships between the social partners are absent (Rizzo, 2009, p.22). 
There seems to be “a general inability to prioritise the national interest, as negotiating parties take a narrow 
and partisan approach” and there is “a tendency of successive administrations to simply set up yet another 
institution every time a stalemate is reached, rather than addressing problems and making institutions work” 
(Rizzo, 2005, p.61). 
 Nevertheless, Malta proved to be resilient during the economic crisis. Several scholars note that the 
coinciding adoption of the euro with the economic crisis in 2008 has shielded Malta from the risks of a 
vulnerable national currency, such as exchange rate fluctuations (Caruana & Theuma, 2012; Azzopardi, 
2009; Adonis, 2011). Furthermore, the Maltese financial sector is relatively small (Azzopardi, 2009) and its 
banking system is depicted as one of the soundest in the world (Adonis, 2011). However, Malta depends 
heavily on international trade, especially in the tourism and manufacturing sector, and these sectors were 
impacted quite severely because of a sharp decline in foreign demand for exports (Azzopardi, 2009; Debono 
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& Borg, 2009). The manufacturing industry’s gross added value decreased with more than 18% in 2009 
(Caruana & Theuma, 2012). Due to a timely and effective intervention, the Maltese government managed 
to mitigate the effects of these sectoral impacts on the economy. The government responded with a 
comprehensive fiscal stimulus package aimed at the micro-level rather than the macro-level.  
 The stimulus package contained public investment in infrastructure, environmental projects and 
incentives to sustain consumer expenditure, such as a decrease in the income tax (Caruana & Theuma, 2012). 
In addition, the most important measure concerned financial assistance to export-oriented firms. In March 
2009, the Maltese government set up a taskforce to negotiate incentive schemes with companies 
experiencing difficulties because of the declining international demand, which resulted in a tailor-made 
solution per company. In return for direct budgetary assistance, the companies had to retain their workforce 
and increase investment and employment possibilities (Fenech, 2010). The measures were targeted at short-
term recovery and long-term growth and competitiveness (Debono & Borg, 2009), while this strategy also 
secured many jobs (Rizzo, 2013). Therefore, it was possible to reach consensus with the trade unions on 
these schemes, even though many firms had to adopt a four day working week. The involvement and 
support of the trade unions contributed to the legitimacy of the schemes. According to Rizzo (2013), the 
consensus reached between the social partners can be considered social pacts at company level. So contrary 
to Luxembourg and Slovenia – where social concertation was troubled by the crisis – in Malta the crisis 
turned out to be an opportunity for close cooperation between the social partners, though it was expressed 
at company level rather than at the national level. Overall, the active stance of the government in seeking 
micro-economic solutions mitigated the effects of the crisis, while the impact of the crisis was relatively 
small in the first place due to the structure of the Maltese economy.  
 
Discussion & conclusion 
This thesis aimed to answer the following research question: To what extent can democratic corporatism 
explain differences in the economic resilience of small European states during and after the 2008 crisis? 
More specifically, the thesis has put Katzenstein’s theory under scrutiny, by testing its applicability to some 
of the smallest member states of the European Union during the economic crisis of 2008. The quantitative 
analysis has shown that there was a statistically significant correlation between democratic corporatism and 
economic resilience during the crisis, which confirms the first hypothesis that the economic crisis impacted 
the economies of small states with democratic corporatist structures less than those states without 
democratic corporatist structures. Contrary to Katzenstein’s Small States in World Markets, in this thesis the 
cases have not been selected on successful economic performance nor on strong democratic corporatist 
structures. Therefore, the fact that the small states with relatively weak democratic corporatist structures 
have been hit harder by the crisis and vice versa, seems to confirm Katzenstein’s theory and makes his causal 
contention more plausible. This thesis thereby deals with the critique from King, Keohane & Verba (1995), 
who found that Katzenstein “would have been able to claim causal validity in some limited instances […] 
when he had variation in his explanatory and dependent variables” (p.478).  
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 However, further qualitative analyses on the economic recovery of Luxembourg and Estonia after 
the economic crisis, do not seem to support the causal link per se. This can be further explained by 
discussing the remaining two hypotheses. First, the policy responses provided by Luxembourg and Estonia 
were indeed different and confirm the second hypothesis. Luxembourg opted for a more inclusive response 
with policies of domestic compensation, while the Estonian government unilaterally pursued radical 
austerity measures. These different responses and the subsequent different policy outcomes seem to be the 
results of the presence or absence of democratic corporatism. However, the relative success of these policies 
cannot really be compared, as the goals of the policies were different. Though the Estonian response to the 
crisis was much less egalitarian than the Luxembourg response, the EU applauded the Estonian fiscal 
discipline (Raudla & Kattel, 2011, p.164) and the Estonian population also seemed to be content with the 
anti-crisis measures, despite the resulting high levels of unemployment. After all, the Estonian government 
met its promised goal of EMU-membership in 2011. In Luxembourg, a lack of consensus in tripartite 
consultations created some social unrest, but it did not result in major political instability. Nevertheless, the 
third hypothesis cannot be confirmed, because the lack of democratic corporatism and the associated 
policies did not cause higher levels of political instability or social unrest in the Baltics, than in Luxembourg.   
 The deviant position of Malta indicates that relatively weak democratic corporatist structures cannot 
be a decisive factor for the economic vulnerability of a small state. The qualitative analysis has given some 
insights into how Malta managed to be resilient instead. The Maltese government managed to avoid the 
polarization in Maltese politics and the lack of social partnership on the national level, by actively seeking 
common ground with the social partners on the micro-level. This is a very unique response, which might 
only be feasible in very small states in which only a small number of relatively large companies employ a 
large portion of the population. Additionally, the traditional literature highlights ‘less diversified economic 
structures’ as one of the main vulnerabilities of small state economies (Kuznets, 1960) and Malta already 
curtailed its vulnerable economic position by the diversification of its economy in the years before the crisis.  
 Overall, the results of this thesis correspond with Katzenstein’s contention that domestic political-
economic structures matter for the policy responses and economic outcomes during a crisis. Democratic 
corporatism is likely to create an egalitarian response to economic adversity, but one needs to make a 
normative claim in order to decide whether this also constitutes a better response, resulting in a more 
successful economic outcome. Even though the very small states included in this thesis are expected to be 
more vulnerable than those analysed by Katzenstein, this thesis showed that these states can achieve 
economic resilience in many ways. Furthermore, social and political stability can also be maintained by 
keeping promises on policy outcomes, instead of consensual policies of domestic compensation. In 
conclusion, it is possible for very small states to domestically shield themselves from their vulnerable 
position in the international economy. Democratic corporatism can be helpful in doing so, but it is not 
decisive. 
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